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Professional Sports Leagues,
Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory:
A Defense of the Status Quot
MICHAEL S. JACOBS*
INTRODUCTION
Professional sports are big business. Last year, Joan Kroc, the owner of
the San Diego Padres baseball team, sold her club for $75 million.' Three
years ago, the Hartford Whalers Hockey Club, which plays in the National
Hockey League's smallest market, sold for $31 million. 2 That same year,
the State of Illinois voted a $60 million stadium subsidy to the Chicago
White Sox baseball team, partly, no doubt, out of civic pride, but largely,
it is thought, to avoid the loss of the estimated $100 million per year that
the team contributes to the state and local economies.3 An average Major
League Baseball player receives an annual salary of almost $500,000. 4 The
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) alone recently contracted to pay a
t © Copyright 1991 by Michael S. Jacobs.
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D.,
1971, Yale University; M.P.H., 1987, Johns Hopkins University. The author wishes to thank
his friend and colleague, Stephen Siegel, for his collegial and constructive criticism of earlier
drafts of this Article and to thank as well the Faculty Research Fund of the DePaul University
College of Law for its support.
1. N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1990, at B8, col. 2. The Padres entered the National League as
an expansion team in 1969 and, with the exception of 1984, when they won the National
League pennant, have had little success on the field. By contrast, the New York Yankees, the
most successful franchise in the history of professional sports, are said to be worth well in
excess of $250 million. Id.
2. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1988, at BIO, col. 5.
3. See Verdi, Don't Blame the, Owners If White Sox Leave, Sporting News, June 27,
1988, at 12. The $60 million figure represented the amount of the initial bonding authority.
Under the final bonding provision, the White Sox received $150 million. And the same
legislature is currently debating whether to fund a new football stadium in Chicago for the
National Football League's Bears, a stadium whose estimated construction cost is at least SIOO
million. Wasson, Illinois, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 26, 1989, at 24.
4. In the past decade, the average salary of a player in the National Football League
(NFL) has risen from about $80,000 to $300,000; that of a player in the National Basketball
Association (NBA) from approximately $175,000 to $750,000; of a player in the National
Hockey League (NHL) from around $90,000 to $220,000; and of a Major League baseball
player from $143,756 to $497,254. At the start of the 1990 baseball season, six players-Kirby
Puckett, Rickey Henderson, Mark Langston, Mark Davis, Robin Yount, and Joe Carter-had
annual salaries of $3 million or more. When asked whether he was worth that much, Puckett
replied, "I don't know. But I know one thing: if they didn't have it to give to you, you sure
wouldn't get it." Los Angeles Times, Jan. 5, 1990, at Pll, col. I.
And the teams certainly have it to give. Over the past ten years, the revenues of professional
sports teams have increased more rapidly than player salaries. From 1980 to 1990, Major
League Baseball's gross revenues went from about $350 million to $1.1 billion; the NFL's
from $415 million to $1.1 billion; the NBA's from $110 million to $370 million; and the
NHL's from $100 million to $330 million. Id.
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billion dollars to Major League Baseball and slightly more than that to the
National Football League (NFL) for the rights to telecast certain games
over the next four years.'
With the growth in the dollar value of professional sports franchises has
come a commensurate increase in the number of lawsuits challenging certain
business practices of the teams and the leagues as restraints of trade. Many
of these lawsuits allege that the teams of the various professional sports
leagues, by collectively adopting and implementing certain rules and regu-
lations, have violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 6 Players, for
example, have attacked league rules that affect their mobility, such as the
reserve clause and free agency, alleging that such rules wrongfully limit
their salaries; 7 aspiring players and others with whom the leagues have
refused to deal have challenged the legality of the player draft and other
league rules resulting in their exclusion; 8 and owners of teams, would-be
owners, and municipalities, eager to benefit from the presence of profes-
5. Asher, CBS Makes $1 Billion NFL Deal; A Four Year Package, Wash. Post, Mar. 9,
1990, at B1. Football and baseball are not the only beneficiaries of the television networks'
largesse. The NBA has recently negotiated a four-year, $600 million television contract with
the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), and the NHL has signed a three-year, $51 million
pact with Sports Channel America. N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1989, at BI, col. 1.
These figures do not represent nearly the total amount paid by television networks for
broadcast rights. For example, several other national networks (the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC), NBC, Turner Network Television (TNT), and the Entertainment and Sports
Programming Network (ESPN)) televise professional football, and the total value of the
League's television contracts with all networks is more than $3.6 billion. N.Y. Times, Mar.
10, 1990, at Al, col. 1. ESPN also televises professional baseball, and many local networks
televise the games of their hometown teams. The New York Yankees, for example, recently
signed a $500 million, 12-year cable television contract with Madison Square Garden Network,
a New York City broadcasting network. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1990, at B1O, col. 1.
6. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, in pertinent part, that: "Every contract, combi-
nation . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce ... is declared to be illegal." 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Powell v.
National Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n,
809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.
1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kapp v. National Football
League, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Mackey v. National
Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Bridgeman
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); Zimmerman v. National
Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n,
389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
8. See, e.g., Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); Boris v.
United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,012 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984);
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Bowman v. National
Football League, 402 F. Supp. 754 (D. Minn. 1975); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management,
325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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sional sports franchises, have challenged league decisions restricting franchise
expansion and relocation.9
The lawsuits spawned by the activities of the professional sports leagues
have generated a lively debate in academic journals regarding the antitrust
status of professional sports leagues. In particular, the debate focuses upon
whether or not such leagues should be regarded as single entities for purposes
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 The importance of the debate is clear.
By prohibiting only those restraints of trade imposed by "combination,
contract, or conspiracy," section 1 sets its focus clearly and exclusively on
joint activity. Restraints of trade created by a single actor or a single firm
are immune from its coverage." Therefore, if the member teams of a
9. See, e.g., National Basketball Ass'n v. San Diego Clippers Basketball Club, 815 F.2d
562 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 960 (1987); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n
v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984); Mid-
South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1215 (1984); Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); San
Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
10. See Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TinL. L. Rav. 751
(1989); Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section
One of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. Rav. 1
(1983); Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis and Sports Leagues: Re-examining the Threshold Ques-
tions, 20 ARIz. ST. L.J. 953 (1988) [hereinafter Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis]; Roberts, The
Antitrust Status of Sports Leagues Revisited, 64 TurL. L. Rav. 117 (1989) [hereinafter Roberts,
Antitrust Status]; Roberts, The Single Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act: An Alternative View, 60 TtnL. L. REv. 562 (1986) [hereinafter Roberts, Single
Entity Status]; Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section
] to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 219 (1984) [hereinafter
Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act]; Weistart, League Control of Market Oppor-
tunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 DUKEa
L.J. 1013.
Several other articles have dealt ith the single-entity issue, but not in the same depth as
the articles cited above. See Blecher & Daniels, Professional Sports and the "Single Entity"
Defense Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 XVH1R L. REv. 217 (1982); Glick,
Professional Sports Franchise Movements and the Sherman Act: When and Where Teams
Should Be Able to Move, 23 SANTA CtARA L. REv. 55 (1983); Gray, Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and Control Over NFL Franchise Locations: The Problem of Opportunistic Behavior, 25
Ai. Bus. L.J. 123 (1987); Kempf, The Misapplication of Antitrust Law to Professional Sports
Leagues, 32 DEPAuL L. REv. 625 (1983); Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and
the Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,
15 CoN. L. Rav. 183 (1983); Lazaroff, The Antitrust Implications of Franchise Relocation
Restrictions in Professional Sports, 53 FoRDHAm L. REv. 157 (1984) [hereinafter Lazaroff,
Antitrust Implications]; Leavell & Millard, Trade Regulation and Professional Sports, 26
MERCER L. Rav. 603 (1975); Rosenbaum, The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports
Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in the Modern Era, 41 U. MLAw L. REv. 729 (1987);
Brock, Comment, A Substantive Test for Sherman Act Plurality: Applications for Professional
Sports Leagues, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 999 (1985).
11. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
This is not, of course, to suggest that such restraints are completely immune from antitrust
scrutiny. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), provides in pertinent part that
1991]
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professional sports league are regarded as a single entity for antitrust
purposes, none of their joint decisions can be attacked under section 1,
since the requisite plurality of actors will be absent.' 2 If, on the other hand,
the member teams are viewed as separate entities, then their collective
actions are properly subject to section 1 scrutiny.
In one sense, the debate over single-entity status seemed settled even
before it began. Early courts that dealt with the legality of agreements
between league members did not directly confront the single-entity defense
but simply assumed that sports leagues were not single firms. 3 Two later
appeals courts that specifically dealt with the defense decisively rejected it.' 4
All of these cases, however, were decided before the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,'5
which overruled the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.16 Since the rationale
"[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Section 2 is fully
applicable to both unilateral and conspiratorial conduct. E.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
12. Cf. Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752. But see North Am. Soccer League v. National Football
League, 670 F.2d 1249, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982):
To tolerate such a loophole would permit league members to escape antitrust
responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit their
league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit would be
outweighed by its anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the restraint might be
adopted more for the protection of individual league members from competition
than to help the league.
Id. at 1257.
The elimination of section 1 as a possible means of attacking league activity still leaves
section 2 as an avenue of pursuit. See supra note 11. But challenges to league activities under
section 2 have been infrequent and, for a variety of reasons, unsuccessful. See United States
Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988); Seattle Totems
Hockey Club v. National Hockey League, 783 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
932 (1986); Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d 772; American Football League v. National Football
League, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963); San Francisco Seals, 379 F. Supp. 966.
Clearly, the single-entity defense would provide no protection, either to the league or to its
member teams, for anticompetitive agreements made with firms outside the league.
13. See Wood, 809 F.2d 954, 958-59; Smith, 593 F.2d at 1177 n.11; Mackey, 543 F.2d at
616 n.19; Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1320; Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 892-93; Kapp, 390 F.
Supp. at 80-82; Philadelphia World Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. at 503-04; United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
But see San Francisco Seals, 379 F. Supp. 966, in which the court found, among other
things, that the NHL is a single entity incapable of conspiring in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. This finding, however, was eroded, if not completely undermined, by the
subsequent holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the National Football League
is not a single entity. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381.
14. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381; North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d
1249.
15. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
16. The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine stood for the proposition that, for purposes of
defining a "conspiracy" within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act, intracorporate
relationships, even close ones, were no bar to a determination that two related corporations
[Vol. 67:25
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for the decisions specifically rejecting the defense seemed to some commen-
tators to rely in part upon that doctrine,17 those commentators seized on
the Copperweld decision as the basis for arguing that the appeals courts
were wrong and that the applicability of the single-entity defense to profes-
sional sports leagues should be reconsidered."
The academic advocates of single-entity treatment all start from the same
premise. First, they contend that a professional sports league is a unique
business, containing an unusual but necessary mixture of interparticipant
competition and cooperation not found in any other kind of partnership or
joint venture. Second, they claim that the Copperweld decision requires that
this uniqueness be recognized as a compelling reason for according a league
single-entity status. Finally, they argue that treating a league as a single
entity will advance "consumer welfare," the main purpose of the antitrust
laws, and is therefore justified on broad policy grounds.' 9
Curiously, the commentators conclude almost uniformly that the teams
of a professional sports league should not be treated as a single entity all
of the time. Even those commentators most strongly in favor of the single-
entity defense concede that it should not apply to all of the conduct in
which a league's member teams engage. For these commentators, it is
proper, and even necessary, to regard a professional sports league as a
single entity for certain purposes and as a plural entity for others.20 Perhaps
had conspired. Thus, in United States v. Yellow Cab Company, 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947), the
Court said "[t]he test of illegality under the Act is the presence or absence of unreasonable
restraint on interstate commerce.... [Tihe common ownership and control of the various
corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the
impact of the Act." The Court repeated and reaffirmed this message in Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) and Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
17. But see infra text accompanying note 43.
18. See the articles by Roberts, supra note 10 and by Weistart, supra note 10, at 1063.
19. Roberts, Single Entity Status, supra note 10, at 589-91; Weistart, supra note 10, at
1061-62; Grauer, supra note 10, at 59. Even Professor Goldman, whose article is largely a
critique of the arguments of Professors Roberts, Grauer, and Weistart, argues that professional
sports leagues should be treated as single entities under certain circumstances. Goldman, supra
note 10, at 793-95.
And Professor Lazaroff, an avowed critic of the Roberts position and an early defender of
the "separate entities" argument, seems to suggest that professional sports leagues might be
deserving of special legislative treatment to help them surmount the hurdle posed by the
inapplicability of the single-entity defense to those leagues. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis, supra
note 10, at 984; Lazaroff, Antitrust Implications, supra note 10, at 216-20.
20. See Roberts, Antitrust Status, supra note 10, at 120 (the doctrine should apply only
when "purely intraleague governance rules or decisions are being challenged"); Roberts, The
Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rules of Reason, and the Doctrine
of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 945, 983 (1988) [hereinafter Roberts, Evolving
Confusion] (doctrine should be adapted to allow "league governance rules and practices" to
be found lawful); Weistart, supra note 10, at 1061 ("some basic decisions" ought to be
removed from antitrust scrutiny).
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more curiously, over the past few years in particular, the debate about the
single-entity defense has become increasingly one-sided, as both old and
new critics of the defense have come to accept the propriety of its use in
at least some circumstances. 2' Advocates and opponents of the defense
almost all agree on a mixed approach to sports leagues, in which the
member teams are seen sometimes as single entities, incapable of violating
section 1, and sometimes as separate firms, very much capable of violating
that section.
This Article will argue that single-entity status is inappropriate and
unnecessary for professional sports leagues. It will proffer that while pro-
fessional sports leagues might initially appear to be significantly different
from other joint ventures, the difference is functionally superficial and does
not justify a fundamental departure from the antitrust rules applicable to
other joint ventures. It will contend further that the Copperweld decision,
so heavily relied upon by the advocates of single-entity status, does not
support their argument, but refutes it instead. It will claim that the hybrid
created by the commentators-the league that is at times a single entity and
at other times a collection of separate actors-is neither a logical creation
nor one that can be usefully defined. Finally, it will argue that the legal
and economic logic of the Supreme Court's recent antitrust opinions strongly
suggest that undiminished output is the best measure of consumer welfare
under the Rule of Reason. When the Rule of Reason is applied to the
governing rules and business decisions of professional sports leagues, it
reveals that few of those rules and decisions serve to decrease the leagues'
output, and therefore the single-entity treatment for those leagues is unnec-
essary to save them from antitrust condemnation.
I. FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENCE OF SPORTS LEAGUES
AND OTHER TYPES OF JOINT VENTURES
One of the major premises of the advocates of the single-entity defense
is that economic characteristics unique to professional sports leagues require
that their member teams be regarded as one entity. There are, they argue,
21. See Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 10, at 984; Lazaroff, Antitrust Implica-
tions, supra note 10, at 216-20.
Professor Goldman criticizes Roberts' arguments in favor of the single-entity defense but
proposes nevertheless that multiple entities, such as the member teams of professional sports
leagues, be treated as single entities if either "(1) a single entity has the right to exercise day-
to-day control over all participants, or (2) the jointly created entity produces a new product
and the co-venturers are acting on behalf of the joint entity without implicating any of their
independent economic interests." Goldman, supra note 10, at 795-97. This is a novel and
complicated proposal that would achieve substantially the same effect as the single-entity




certain "fundamental facts" 22 which distinguish such sports leagues from
all other types of business firms in our economy and which compel unique
antitrust treatment for "purely intraleague governance rules or decisions."
23
This premise does not, however, withstand analytical scrutiny.
The NFL, the paradigm used by all of the commentators, seems to have
many of the characteristics typical of joint ventures. 24 It is comprised of
twenty-eight independent, separately owned teams.25 Some of the clubs are
corporations, some are partnerships, and some are sole proprietorships, but
each is legally separate from the others. 26 The clubs engage in some signif-
icant revenue sharing27 but do not share profits, losses, or capital expendi-
tures. 28 Each club is responsible for making its own managerial decisions,
sometimes in direct competition with the others. 29
22. According to Professor Roberts, there are two such facts: "(1) that the product of a
league cannot be produced by any one member team but rather is only produced by the
complete integration and cooperation of each and every member of the league; and (2) that a
league member team does not and cannot lawfully have any relevant independent productive
function outside its existence as a wholly integrated member of the league." Roberts, Antitrust
Status, supra note 10, at 120.
23. Id.
24. In North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1252 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals characterized
the NFL teams as "separate economic entities engaged in a joint venture," and in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 990 (1984), the League contended that its structure was "akin to a
partnership or joint venture."
25. The League was founded in 1920 under the name American Professional Football
Association and adopted its current name in 1922. Its first championship game occurred in
1933, and the first player draft was held in 1935. From time to time, new leagues have been
formed to compete with the NFL, most recently the United States Football League; but with
the exception of the American Football League-founded in 1959 and joined by merger to the
NFL in 1966 (see 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988), which, among other things, exempted that merger
from the reach of the antitrust laws)-each of those other leagues failed. United States Football
League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1343 (2d Cir. 1988).
26. The League itself is an unincorporated, not-for-profit, "association." It has a New
York City office run by the Commissioner, and its primary functions include "scheduling,
resolving disputes among players and franchises, supervising officials, discipline and public
relations." Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1389.
27. All of the clubs share equally the proceeds from the sale of pooled television rights.
National Football League Constitution and Bylaws art. X, § 10.3 (1988) [hereinafter NFL
Constitution]. They also share the gate receipts from league games but not equally: the home
team receives 60% of the gross receipts after certain deductions. See id. art. XIX, § 19.1.
Congress has granted the NFL an exemption from the antitrust laws for its pooled television
rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
28. North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1252. Although circumstances-and in particular
the size of television revenues-have changed significantly since 1977 and 1978, it is noteworthy
that in 1978, 2 of the NFL teams lost money; and in 1977, 12 of the teams lost money. Id.
at 1252. As late as 1952 there were NFL teams that declared bankruptcy, and NFL Commis-
sioner Alvin R. "Pete" Rozelle once testified that '41 franchises failed in the first 41 years
of the League's existence."' United States Football League, 842 F.2d at 1343 (quoting
Transcripts of Proceedings at 55, United States v. National Football League, No. 12808 (E.D.
Pa. July 27, 1961)).
29. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.
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Naturally, though, for the League to function smoothly the teams must
cooperate on a multitude of matters. 30 In some respects, the extent of this
required cooperation is unusually broad. Among other things, procedural
rules for administering the League must be announced; schedules of exhi-
bition, regular-season, and playoff games must be established; rules must
be created to govern the conduct of the games themselves; 3' and a system
of player allocation must be effectuated. 32
It is this apparently unique mixture of, and necessity for, competition on
the playing field and administrative cooperation off it that, in the view of
most commentators, distinguishes professional sports leagues from other
joint ventures.3 3 For these commentators, the presence of extensive and
30. The relationship between the member teams is largely fixed by contract. The League's
Constitution and Bylaws, a substantial document of 86 pages, sets out a detailed set of
contractual obligations running between the teams and also between the teams and the league.
NFL Constitution, supra note 27.
31. Since 1970, when the National and American Football Leagues merged, the League
has been responsible for the national and international promotion of professional football, the
granting of team franchises, the negotiation of network television contracts for broadcast rights
to the games of the member teams, and the hiring of referees, in addition to the matters
described above. North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1251; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum,
726 F.2d at 1389.
32. The system of player allocation for the NFL, for example, is embodied in the player
draft, the "No-Tampering Rule," and the "Rozelle Rule."
Article XIV of the NFL Constitution and Bylaws ("Selection Meeting") provides for an
annual draft of players who are eligible to play in the League and establishes a procedure for
that draft that gives first priority in selection to the team with the worst record in the previous
season and last priority to the team with the best record in the previous season, a procedure
designed to strengthen the weaker teams and thus to maintain or improve competitive balance
on the playing field. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Once drafted, a player is placed on the drafting team's reserve list. NFL Constitution, supra
note 27, art. XIV, § 14.5.
Article IX, § 9.2 of the NFL Constitution, commonly known as the No-Tampering Rule,
forbids a team from negotiating with or making an offer to a player who is on the active,
reserve, or selection list of any other team.
Article XII, § 12.1 of the NFL Constitution, commonly known as the Rozelle Rule, has
been described by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals as follows:
The Rozelle Rule essentially provides that when a player's contractual obligation
to a team expires and he signs with a different club, the signing club must
provide compensation to the player's former team. If the two clubs are unable
to conclude mutually satisfactory arrangements, the Commissioner may award
compensation in the form of one or more players and/or draft choices as he
deems fair and equitable.
Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977).
An extended discussion of the relationship between player restraints and antitrust law is
beyond the scope of this Article, but it remains a very lively one, especially in light of the
expiration of the latest collective bargaining agreement between the players and the clubs and
the apparent decertification of the Players' Union as the players' exclusive bargaining agent.
See Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989); Bridgeman v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987).
33. See, e.g., J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, TnE LAW OF SPoRTs, § 5.11 (1979).
[Vol. 67:25
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continuing cooperation in the midst of bitter rivalry and struggle makes
professional sports leagues singularly unlike any other business and requires
that they receive unique treatment under the antitrust laws.1
4
In a simple sense, of course, the commentators are correct. The NFL
must relish the fact that football fans in the New York metropolitan area,
for example, participate vicariously in the fierce on-field competition be-
tween the New York Giants and the New York Jets, yet neither team has
any desire to put the other out of business. Every club, the courts have
recognized, is keenly and directly interested in the economic well-being of
every other club. 5 Economic well-being depends in large measure upon the
continued presence of healthy rivalry, not in name alone but in the form
of close and well-contested football games. Only with such rivalry can the
League attract and maintain the kind of enduring interest among consumers
and sponsors that will make its business a profitable one. The creation and
maintenance of that interest is, in turn, heavily dependent upon an approx-
imate competitive balance on the field.3 6 The need to perpetuate relatively
Professor Roberts also argues that league sports are unique because no one team can produce
even so much as a game without the agreement of another league team to act as its opponent.
Roberts, Antitrust Status, supra note 10, at 131. This is true, of course, but only because the
league members have chosen contractually to impose this requirement upon themselves and
thus to produce league football games and not some other kind, such as intrasquad games or
exhibitions not involving another league team. This "uniqueness" is not inherent to football
games-as any fan of collegiate football knows, many of the most popular college teams do
not belong to any league or conference-but is a format chosen by league members to make
their product more attractive to consumers. The format certainly seems to be successful, but
it is not the only format in which professional football games can be played and marketed.
34. See Roberts, Antitrust Status, Roberts, Single Entity Status, Roberts, Sports Leagues
and the Sherman Act, supra note 10; Weistart, supra note 10.
35. North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1253 ("ITihe economic success of each franchise
is dependent on the quality of sports competition throughout the league and the economic
strength and stability of other league members. Damages to or losses by any league member
can affect adversely the stability, success and operations of other members."); Smith, 593
F.2d at 1179 ("No NFL team, in short, is interested in driving another team out of business,
whether in the counting-house or on the football field, for if the League fails, no one team
can survive."); United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa.
1953) ("If all the teams should compete as hard as they can in a business way, the stronger
teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure. If this should happen
not only would the weaker teams fail, but eventually the whole league ... would fail .... ).
36. Neither the League nor any of its teams would welcome, for example, a situation where
two of the teams became so consistently powerful that none of the others could beat them.
Fans and television sponsors would presumably be uninterested in seeing or televising one-
sided contests; and a league that was eventually reduced to only two teams (or three or four
or six)-even incredibly good ones-would have much less consumer and sponsor appeal than
a larger league that was competitively balanced.
Such a fate actually befell the All America Conference, a league that competed with the
NFL in the 1940s. So totally did the Cleveland Browns dominate the Conference that consumer
interest quickly waned, not only among the fans of the teams that were losing to the Browns,
but also among the Browns' fans as well. Once the Browns' dominance became apparent,
attendance at their home games over a four-year period dropped from an average of about
65,000 spectators per game to about 20,000. Ahern, Note, The NFL's Final Victory Over
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.: Single Entity-Interleague Economic Analysis, 27 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 541, 556 n.87 (1978).
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balanced competition on the field through explicit and ongoing cooperation
off it thus appears to differentiate sports leagues from most other joint
businesses, where the prosperity of one company is enhanced-not dimin-
ished-by the failure of its rivals.17
In another, more important sense, though, the commentators are wrong
to dwell on these apparently special characteristics of professional sports
leagues. The seemingly odd mixture of competition and cooperation is not
so peculiar as might first appear. All joint venturers cooperate with each
other in order to make and sell their products. Such cooperation is the very
essence of a joint venture. Professional sports teams are no different. What
distinguishes them from other businesses in this regard is that their product
is a season's worth-many seasons' worth-of rivalry and meaningful
competition, competition that will generate and sustain fan loyalties, tele-
vision viewers, and commercial sponsors for years and years." But even the
most natural rivalries and the most intense fan interest will fade if one
team consistently dominates the others. Therefore, in order to make a
product whose attractiveness to consumers will endure, the teams-like any
other efficient joint venture-need to establish and implement mechanisms
designed to promote quality control. In this business, the quality control-
and the cooperation that it entails-is intended to assure a high degree of
on-field competitive balance,3 9 because in professional sports the greater
such balance the higher the quality of the product.
The cooperation that is so startling to many of the commentators thus
seems to be no more, and no less, than a continuing form of quality
control. 4° Cooperating to produce competition seems no different function-
37. The proposition that the financial success of the member teams of a professional sports
league requires that they be approximate equals on the playing field has not been seriously
debated, either by legal scholars critical of league practices, Weistart, supra note 10, at 1018
n.17, or by economists who have examined the business characteristics of professional sports
leagues, see H. DEMMERT, THE ECONONCS OF PROrasSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 10 (1973); J.
MARKHAM & P. T'LITZ, BASEBALL EcONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 19-20 (1981); Neale, The
Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3 (1964).
38. What is intuitive to most sports fans in this regard is also statistically true. Thus,
according to Demmert, a game pitting one good team against another will sell more tickets
than a game in which a weak team plays either a good team or another weak one. H.
DEMMERT, supra note 37, at 11.
39. Since the competitive ability of any particular team is largely a function of the abilities
of its players, and since the NFL, for example, has not yet placed any limit on player salaries,
its rules regarding revenue sharing and restrictions on player movement are arguably necessary
to prevent teams with wealthier owners or in larger markets from buying up all of the best
player talent and thus distorting the league's competitive balance. Limits on the number of
players that a team may have on its roster at any one time arguably serve the same goal.
40. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has described the business of the NFL as
"providing public entertainment in the form of competitive football games." North Am.
Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1251 (emphasis added). In a league whose teams operate in different
markets and are owned and managed by people of differing degrees of wealth and talent, it
should come as no surprise that extensive cooperation among league members is necessary to
maintain the quality level-the competitive nature-of the league's product.
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ally from cooperating to produce an automobile. The products are different,
of course, but their respective methods of production appear strikingly
similar. There is, consequently, no reason to regard professional sports
leagues as economically unique or to accord them antitrust treatment dif-
ferent from that given to other joint ventures.4 '
II. THE SCOPE OF COPPER wELD: SINGLE-ENTITY TREATMENT FOR
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES AND JOINT VENTURES
Even assuming for argument's sake that professional sports leagues are
unique in some economically significant way, it does not follow that this
uniqueness should form the basis for single-entity treatment under Copper-
weld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.42 The opinion in Copperweld does
not make single entities of joint ventures, even arguably unique ones. Rather,
Copperweld stands for the simple proposition that corporations and their
wholly owned subsidiaries, and only such firms, constitute one entity for
antitrust purposes.
Neither the Supreme Court nor any of the appellate courts that have
applied Copperweld has extended its holding to joint ventures. Nevertheless,
the advocates of the single-entity defense contend vigorously that the holding
of Copperweld should be extended beyond its specific and logical boundaries
to encompass unique joint ventures, such as professional sports leagues.
This contention has no doctrinal support, either in Copperweld itself or in
any of its appellate court progeny.
43
41. The "fundamental facts" cited by Professor Roberts in support of his argument for
special treatment, supra note 22, refer in part to the integration and cooperation discussed
above. Professor Roberts also claims that the leagues are unique because no league member
has or can have an independent productive function outside of its league membership. Roberts,
Antitrust Status, supra note 10, at 120. This claim seems tautological: the reason that league
members can produce nothing independently is that they have bound themselves contractually
not to do so, not because it is inherently impossible. If they were not bound contractually in
that manner, league members could theoretically conduct intrasquad exhibition games or games
against teams that were not league members. Moreover, twenty or thirty years ago (before the
cost of a franchise became prohibitive even for wealthy people) it would have perhaps been
possible for a very wealthy entity to buy all of the teams in the league, staff them with players,
coaches, and administrators, and run the league as a single firm. That this theoretical possibility
did not actually occur probably owes more to the quality notions discussed above than it does
to the impossibility argument of Roberts: the competitive vigor of a league run by one firm-
even a league with many evenly balanced teams-would probably seem suspect to consumers.
The present structure of professional football, however, is not the only legally permissible or
economically viable one. It may be the best structure (though even that is only conjectural),
but its adoption on the part of the team owners was never obligatory in any sense.
42. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
43. Nor, for that matter, does it find support in the appellate court antecedents of
Copperweld. The basic premise for reviving the single-entity argument, it will be recalled, is
that the two appeals court decisions explicitly rejecting it had relied in significant part upon
the intraenterprise doctrine later overruled in Copperweld. See Roberts, Single Entity Status,
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The issue before the Supreme Court in Copperweld was a narrow one.
Independence Tube Corporation, a newly founded company, sued Copper-
weld and Regal, the wholly owned subsidiary, alleging, among other things,
that they had conspired to harm Independence's business in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act." The jury found for Independence on the
Sherman Act claim. The defendants appealed, arguing that they were in
effect one entity and that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine should be
re-examined and repealed. After the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the jury verdict4 5 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine "whether a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are
legally capable of conspiring with each other under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 46
The answer to that issue was equally narrow. A parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary share a complete unity of interest, said the
Court.47 The parent's exercise of decisional dominion over its exclusive
property could not deprive the marketplace of any of the "independent
centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and demands, ' 48 nor
could the obedience of the wholly owned subsidiary, because it is both
practically and legally obligated to obey the parent. 49 To regard concerted
activity between those kinds of firms as containing any potential for reducing
competition would thus be to assume a view of the parent-subsidiary
relationship that lacks any factual or theoretical support. For these reasons,
the Court held that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are legally
incapable of conspiring within the meaning of section 1.50
The importance of the Copperweld decision lies as much in what the
Court excluded from its consideration as in what it included. In the first
place, the Court specifically limited its inquiry to the relationship between
a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary and expressly refused
to consider "under what circumstances, if any, a parent may be liable for
supra note 10, at 586-90. But the commentators were wrong to find such reliance, at least in
the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984). The court there
evaluated the activity of the League and its members by reference to the Ninth Circuit's well-
established exception to the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, an exception which provided
in effect that concerted activity would not be found among 'multiple corporations operated
as a single entity' when 'corporate policies are set by one individual or by a parent corpora-
tion"'-a position that anticipated the Copperweld holding. Id. at 1388 (quoting General
Business Systems v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 1983)). The court,
however, then found that the NFL and its member teams did not fit within that exception.
Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
45. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1982).
46. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 755.
47. Id. at 771-72.
48. Id. at 769.
49. Id. at 771.
50. Id. at 777.
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conspiring with an affiliated corporation it does not completely own."'" It
implicitly refused to consider all other forms of business relationships and
corporate arrangements and, in particular, made no mention whatsoever of
joint ventures. In the second place, the Court was concerned only with the
financial relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. It
displayed no interest in the nature of the businesses in which they were
engaged. The specifics of Copperweld's business were not discussed in any
way, nor was there even the slightest suggestion that the applicability of
the single-entity defense hinged on the type of products made by Copperweld
and Regal or on the degree of their relative integration. All that impressed
the Court was the ownership interest between those companies.
Copperweld thus provides no support whatsoever to the advocates of
single-entity treatment for professional sports leagues. Its analysis focused
entirely on financial ownership and control and ignored the so-called func-
tional questions thought by those advocates to be so critical. Its inquiry
was expressly limited to one form of business relationship, all others being
specifically excluded from consideration. Its language does not intimate,
even obliquely, that special treatment might somehow be in order for
functionally unique joint ventures.
Since Copperweld, almost all of the case law implicating the single-entity
issue has dealt with commonly owned corporations, rather than with part-
nerships or joint ventures, and has reaffirmed the principle that single-entity
status is appropriate only when the companies share a complete unity of
interest and purpose, 52 or when one firm exercises complete control over
the other.53 In those cases where either the requisite unity of ownership
interest or totality of control was found lacking, the post-Copperweld courts
almost unanimously declined to grant the alleged conspirators single-entity
status.5 4 Significantly, in none of the cases did the courts examine the nature
51. Id. at 767.
52. See, e.g., Century Oil Tool, Inc. v. Production Specialties, 737 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir.
1984) (commonly owned firms have complete unity of purpose); Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life
Ins., 739 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1984) (wholly owned subsidiaries and parent have a common
purpose); H.R.M. Inc. v. Tele-Communications, 653 F. Supp. 645 (D. Colo. 1987) (parent
and two subsidiaries all share complete unity of interest); Gucci v. Gucci Shops, Inc., 651 F.
Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (commonly owned corporations have a unity of purpose); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lyons, 405 N.W.2d 354 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (parent and wholly owned
subsidiary cannot conspire); see also, Directory Sales Management Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel.,
833 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987) (wholly owned subsidiaries are not separate entities); Satellite
Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 643 F. Supp. 449 (D. Del. 1986) (parent and wholly
owned subsidiaries are not separate entities); Hudson's Bay Co. v. American Legend Coop.,
651 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J. 1986) (section I prohibition only applies to conduct of two or more
entities).
53. See, e.g., Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., 673 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (full
control); Novatel Communications, Inc. v. Cellular Telephone Supply, 1986-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 67,412 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (fifty-one percent subsidiary under "full control" of parent).
54. See, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hospitals, 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,790 (E.D. Cal.
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of the business in which the alleged conspirators were engaged when those
courts decided the single-entity issue.
None of the post-Copperweld cases has considered directly the single-
entity status of professional sports leagues. 55 There have been, however,
some cases involving the single-entity status of other types of joint ventures.
The most significant of these cases clearly rejected the single-entity defense.
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,5 6 plaintiff alleged that
1987) (no complete unity of interest between hospital and contract anesthesiologists), aff'd,
929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1991); Aspen Title & Escrow v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477
(D. Or. 1987) (dismissal of claim inappropriate where subsidiaries not wholly owned); Sonitrol
of Fresno, Inc. v. AT&T, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,080 (D.D.C. 1986) (less than wholly
owned subsidiaries are separate actors because complete control and unity of interest are
lacking). But cf. City of Mount Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.
1988) (related companies are single entity despite lack of complete unity of interest).
55. The NFL specifically sought to avail itself of the single-entity defense in cases decided
by two different appeals courts in the early 1980s. See supra text accompanying note 14.
In the first of those cases, North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d
1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982), a professional soccer league complained
that section 1 of the Sherman Act was violated by the NFL's prohibition of cross-ownership,
a ban that prevents league members from owning a team in another professional sports league.
The NFL argued that it was shielded from the reach of section 1 by virtue of its status as a
single entity, an argument that the Second Circuit unequivocally rejected. Relying for the most
part on a large group of intraenterprise conspiracy and sports restraint cases, the court stated
that the Supreme Court had consistently denied exemption from section 1 of the Sherman Act
to joint ventures and that according single-entity status to the league would immunize its
activities from antitrust scrutiny even when the net effect of those activities was anticompetitive.
Id. at 1257.
Copperweld does not seem to have changed the view of the Second Circuit on this matter.
In a recent case not dealing directly with the single-entity defense, the court stated:
[S]ports leagues raise numerous difficult antitrust questions involving horizontal
restraints and group boycotts. The very concept of a league involving separate
business entities (teams) requires concerted behavior among them and the exclusion
of outsiders. Even the drawing up of a schedule requires that horizontal com-
petitors (teams) conform to jointly made decisions and necessarily excludes others.
United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1372 (2d Cir.
1988).
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 726 F.2d 1381, the Coliseum and the Oakland Raiders
challenged the legality of rule 4.3 of the League's Constitution and Bylaws, which forbids any
league member from relocating the site of its home games without the prior approval of at
least three-fourths of the existing member teams. The League again raised the single-entity
claim as a defense to the alleged violation of section 1, and the Ninth Circuit, like the Second,
completely rejected it. The Ninth Circuit based its rejection of the defense on three separate
arguments. First, it cited the precedent created by earlier cases finding that other League rules,
such as the draft, the cross-ownership ban, and the so-called "Rozelle Rule," all violated
section 1. Second, it found the League's argument inconsistent with Supreme Court pron-
ouncements on the single-entity doctrine. Finally, it found for a variety of reasons that the
League could not satisfy the Ninth Circuit's exception to the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Among the reasons were that league policies were set not by a parent company but by the
member teams acting jointly; neither profit nor loss was shared between the teams; and the
need for substantial cooperation could not suffice to exclude otherwise independent concerns
from section I scrutiny. Id. at 1388-89.
See also Association of Indep. Television Stations v. College Football Ass'n, 637 F. Supp.
1289, 1299 n.8 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (College Football Association denied summary judgment
on its claim of single-entity defense).
56. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
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Atlas, a national moving company, and its affiliated independent moving
companies had collectively adopted a policy that constituted a "group
boycott" in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Before deciding the
substantive boycott question, the court unequivocally rejected Atlas's ar-
gument that the single-entity defense should completely protect it and its
joint venturers from any antitrust claim predicated on section 1. The Atlas
policy challenged by Rothery, wrote Judge Bork, was placed into effect by
"legally separate corporations," each of whom was "an actual or potential
competitor" of Atlas.17 Moreover, "all but two members of the [Atlas]
Board [of Directors] represented separate legal entities that competed in
interstate commerce. 51 8 For these reasons, Atlas and its affiliated companies
were not entitled to avail themselves of the single-entity defense.
Professional sports leagues are functionally indistinguishable from the
moving company joint venture examined in Rothery. Like the moving
companies, the member teams of a sports league are "legally separate"
from each other, and like those companies, they are "actual or potential
competitors. ' 59 The Rothery court suggested no other factor as significant
to the resolution of the single-entity question. Consequently, for reasons
similar to those announced in Rothery, it seems very probable that other
post-Copperweld courts would refuse to permit the member teams of a
professional sports league to use the single-entity defense. 60
57. Id. at 214.
58. Id. at 214-15. Of course, the finding that Atlas and its affiliates were separate firms
for purposes of section 1 did not end the antitrust inquiry; it began it. Having found a
plurality of actors to exist, Judge Bork then proceeded to apply the Rule of Reason to the
alleged boycott, deciding ultimately that the practice was competitively reasonable. Id. at 229.
In the process, Judge Bork noted, significantly from the perspective of the arguments made
in this Article, that "[i]t is also a boycott if the Ivy League refuses to admit a new college to
membership or the American League refuses to admit a baseball team." Id. at 215 n.l. It is
not necessarily an unlawful boycott or a commercially unreasonable one, but a boycott
nonetheless, because these two groups of joint venturers, consisting as they do of "legally
separate corporations" and "actual or potential competitors," are not single entities within
the meaning of section 1.
59. The Ninth Circuit specifically found that the member teams of the NFL did, and
could, compete with each other in a number of significant ways. Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390.
60. Since Copperweld, a number of federal courts have treated professional sports leagues
as if they were groupings of separate teams capable of conspiring within the meaning of
section 1. In Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
II1 S. Ct. 711 (1991), and in Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960
(D.N.J. 1987), cases dealing with the relationship between the nonstatutory labor exemption
for certain collective bargaining activity and team antitrust liability for restraints in the market
for player services, both courts clearly suggested that in the absence of labor law immunity,
section 1 of the Sherman Act could apply to league restraints on the labor market.
A fuller discussion of the nonstatutory labor exemption is beyond the scope of this Article.
For additional cases describing and analyzing it, however, see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
Local Union No. 189 & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1975);
Amalgated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
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Viewed then as joint ventures, even as "unusual" joint ventures, profes-
sional sports leagues and their member teams fail to satisfy either the
Copperweld test or the most relevant post-Copperweld test for single-entity
treatment. Since each of the teams is financially, legally, and managerially
distinct from all of the others, the complete unity of interest and control
required by Copperweld is lacking. Since the teams are truly separate legal
entities who do compete with each other in a number of important ways,
the Rothery test is not satisfied either. Neither Copperweld nor any of its
progeny, therefore, seems to provide an appropriate basis for challenging
the conclusions reached by the Second and Ninth Circuits in the earlier
cases dealing with the applicability of the single-entity defense to professional
sports leagues. 61
Some of the legal commentators, however, think otherwise. For them,
Copperweld unravelled the rationales of the earlier sports league cases and
represented the major building block for the single-entity argument. Pro-
fessor Roberts is one of these commentators. 62 Roberts argues that Cop-
perweld implicitly provides three bases for treating a professional sports
league as a single entity. The message of Copperweld, he contends, is that
the determination of single-entity status for a professional sports league
should hinge not on whether the clubs "are separately organized, separately
owned, or maintain separate accounting for profit and loss" but rather on
"the inherent economic realities of the intraorganizational relationship"
between and among them. 63 For Roberts, matters of ownership, organiza-
tion, and accounting are all questions of "organizational choice," appar-
ently optional decisions that could easily be manipulated to satisfy the
current antitrust rules. In his view, the economic realities that should dictate
the resolution of the single-entity question are clear: since "[n]o single team
is capable of producing anything of value, . . . the league ... is the lowest
form of . . .entity capable of producing and marketing the league prod-
uct"; 65 and because the league, logically enough, is the only entity able to
produce league football, we should regard its members as having the same
unity of interest and control as are possessed by a parent corporation and
its wholly owned subsidiary.
689 (1965). For cases discussing it in the sports context, see Wood v. National Basketball
Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 958-63 (2d Cir. 1987); McCourt v. California Sports, 600 F.2d 1193,
1197-1203 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611-16 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Zimmerman v. National Football League,
632 F. Supp. 398, 403-08 (D.D.C. 1986).
61. See supra text accompanying note 55.
62. This Article focuses largely on the work of Professor Roberts because his scholarship
is the most extensive, see supra note 10, and the most articulate and authorative of the recent
academic discussions of the single-entity issue.
63. Roberts, Single Entity Status, supra note 10, at 586.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 589.
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Professor Roberts argues first that Copperweld takes a functional, pro-
duction-based approach to the single-entity issue, and not the structural
approach described above. The Copperweld Court, however, did not adopt
the approach attributed to it by Professor Roberts. 66 In fact the Court paid
no attention whatsoever to the "economic realities" of the relationship
between Copperweld and its subsidiary. For the Court, the critical fact was
surely Copperweld's complete ownership of its subsidiary. Ownership had
critical functional relevance to the question of conspiracy: because Copper-
weld owned Regal, it could lawfully dictate-was required to dictate-
Regal's policies and actions. Regal also could do nothing of which Cop-
perweld disapproved. Thus, treating Copperweld and Regal as two entities
would be tantamount to treating the same individual as two separate beings,
while treating them as one not only seemed logical but also could result in
no loss of independent decisionmaking.
Roberts' second point about Copperweld, that the league is the only form
capable of producing anything of value, also seems questionable. It seems
clear that a firm such as Copperweld-about to acquire an independent
company and faced with the decision whether to organize its purchase as a
wholly owned subsidiary or as a division of the parent-has certain organ-
izational choices available to it. It seems equally clear that the Supreme
Court was correct in deciding that whether Copperweld absorbed its new
purchase or allowed it to stand free should not be the dispositive factor in
answering the single-entity question. If Regal lacked functional indepen-
dence-as it surely did-separate corporate status would not confer any on
it. But Copperweld had real choices that are not even remotely available to
the NFL.
Although organizing the NFL as one corporation with twenty-eight wholly
owned subsidiaries when the league was formed in 1920 might have been
theoretically possible, though highly unlikely, the prospect of undoing the
present ownership structures of the teams and replacing them with a parent-
subsidiary model or some other form seems impossible now. The indepen-
dent team owners, though they have over the years ceded a good deal of
their autonomy to the league and the Commissioner,67 have nevertheless
66. Professor Roberts acknowledges this but argues that the "essence" of Copperweld is
to regard a joint venture as a single-entity unless "the integration of its subunits brings
together inherently independent sources of 'economic power that [were] previously pursuing
divergent goals."' Id. at 588 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769). This statement is itself
difficult to parse: first, on the level of meaning (what is an "inherently independent" source
of economic power? what is a "divergent" goal?); and second, on the level of rationality (if
we knew what constituted a "divergent" goal, what would we do about joint venturers who
had previously been pursuing a variety of goals, some divergent and some not?).
67. The NFL Constitution and Bylaws, for example, imposes numerous restrictions on the
owners of the member teams. To recite but a few, player contracts must be executed on a
standard form adopted by the League, NFL Constitution, supra note 27, art. XV, § 15.1; the
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retained a large share of it.6 Additionally, though no data exist showing
the attitudes of the team owners to the idea of corporate reorganization, it
seems intuitively unlikely that the prospect of relinquishing independent
ownership and merging their various legal structures would strike them as
being a true "organizational choice."
The third prong of Roberts' argument about the implications of Copper-
weld for professional sports leagues is based upon three related ideas. The
first is that Copperweld, despite all of its language to the contrary, is not
concerned with ownership or organization, but is focused instead on ex-
amining the "economic realities" of the corporate relationships in question
and, in particular, on seeking out the smallest economic unit capable of
producing something of value. The second is that that unit, no matter how
many separately owned corporate subunits it might contain, should be
treated as a single-entity for section 1 purposes. The third is that the league
is the smallest unit capable of producing league football. 69
Let us ignore for a moment the tautology that the league is the smallest
entity capable of producing league football. Let us assume as well that
league football is the only kind of professional football attractive to
consumers70 and that professional league football is a separate product unto
itself.7' In order to agree with Roberts' reading of Copperweld, one must
Commissioner must approve any amendments to the form, id.; and the League has the power
to review any team decision affecting players or team operations if that decision is arguably
"detrimental to professional football," id. art. VIII, §§ 8.6, 8.13, 8.14, art. XV, § 15.4, a
power analogous to that of the Commissioner of Major League Baseball. See Charles 0.
Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir.) (Commissioner has power to prevent sale of
players), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
68. Each club decides on the ticket prices for its own home games, on player acquisitions
and salaries, and on the employment of coaches and administrators; and each negotiates the
terms of its stadium lease and the local radio broadcast of its games. See Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F. Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981);
Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports, Oversight Hearings before the Subcomm. on Mo-
nopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist & 2d
Sess. 528 (1982) (testimony of Commissioner Pete Rozele).
69. Roberts, Single Entity Status, supra note 10, at 589.
70. This assumption is not necessarily acceptable to all commentators. Professor Lazaroff,
for example, has argued forcefully that while the game of football certainly requires two teams
for its production it need not be produced inevitably in league format and is capable of being
marketed in the form of exhibition games, either regularly scheduled or as part of a barn-
storming tour. Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 10, at 958-60. And according to
Goldman, the truth of this proposition is borne out not only by history-before there was a
NFL, for example, there were independent teams playing schedules of their own devising
against other such teams-but also by the continuing example of the Harlem Globetrotters,
who for years have profitably played exhibition games against an opponent selected and paid
by the Globetrotter organization. Goldman, supra note 10, at 771.
71. There has been a lively academic debate on this topic as well. See Glick, supra note
10, at 77-78; Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 10, at 975; Roberts, Evolving Confusion,
supra note 20, at 1013; Roberts, Single Entity Status, supra note 10, at 564 n.8.
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find in that opinion some indication that the smallest entity capable of
producing a desirable product is immune from section 1 coverage-even
when the subunits of that entity are separately owned, separately incorpo-
rated, and active competitors in some areas directly pertinent to the pro-
duction of the joint product. There is, however, no such indication.
We have already examined Copperweld's focus on common ownership
and control,7 2 arguing that those two factors were central to the Court's
holding. For the Copperweld Court, complete common ownership and
control meant that two nominally separate firms could be treated as one.
Because real competition between parent and wholly owned subsidiary is
not a practical possibility, no competition would be lost by treating the two
firms as a single entity. Treating a grouping of true competitors as a single
entity has an obviously different impact, however, on the competition
quotient. Courts that have examined the workings of the NFL, for example,
have found that its member teams compete in a variety of meaningful
ways. 73 According single-entity treatment to those teams would potentially
reduce or eliminate that competition and make future competition less
likely. This prospect, however, runs directly counter to the rationale behind
Copperweld.
There seem to be two logical fallacies in this aspect of Roberts' treatment
of Copperweld. On the one hand, Roberts agrees with part of the rationale
behind Copperweld: he considers single-entity treatment to be appropriate
only when it would not result in a lessening of real competition.7 4 On the
other hand, he seems to believe that competition can never be lessened, in
any way, by the creation of a joint venture among the smallest group of
firms capable of producing a particular product. It is not at all clear,
though, why the members of that group should be regarded as being
incapable of competing with each other as a matter of law when it has
already been judicially recognized that they are economic competitors as a
matter of fact.
III. TBE WISDOM OF SINGLE-ENTITY TREATMENT
FOR PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
Copperweld is definitive in its antitrust treatment of the relationship
between a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary. The two
72. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
74. Roberts, Single Entity Status, supra note 10, at 584-85.
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corporations are one for antitrust purposes, all of the time and for all
relevant antitrust purposes. The opinion does not even consider the possi-
bility that a group of related firms might be a single entity at certain times
and a combination of separate entities at others. Professors Roberts and
Weistart, however, take the position that the member teams of a sports
league should be viewed as a single entity when they engage in particular
activities related to the business of the league but not when they engage in
activities unrelated to "league governance rules and practices. '7 5 This po-
sition is both analytically and logically unsatisfying.
In particular, Professor Roberts argues in his latest article that courts
should adopt the single-entity defense, or one of its doctrinal analogues, in
order "to allow leagues to win on dispositive pretrial motion when only
purely intraleague governance rules or decisions are being challenged. ' 76
Professor Roberts does not distinguish either in that article or elsewhere
between those rules and decisions that concern "purely intraleague gover-
nance" and those that do not; nor, for that matter, does he ever define
the term "governance. ' 77
Professor Roberts' contention that a league of professional sports teams
can and should be viewed as one entity sometimes and as a group of entities
at others is both confusing and impractical. If a league and its member
teams are one entity, then logic would seem to indicate that they would be
one entity all of the time and not just for some of it. If, as Roberts
suggests, the league is a single entity when it discusses "purely intraleague"
75. In one of his earlier articles, Roberts argued that "league governance rules and practices
are inherently consistent with antitrust goals," in part because they are the product of a single
entity and therefore should be held lawful on pretrial motion. See supra note 20, at 983. The
obvious implication of this argument is that league activities that do not concern "league
governance rules and practices" (terms which Roberts did not define) should not receive single-
entity treatment, even though they are performed by the same entity that created the arguably
lawful rules and practices.
In his most recent article, Roberts contends that the single-entity defense could protect a
league's "purely intraleague governance rules or decisions"; and, though he does not abandon
his support of the single-entity defense, he admits that it may not be critical to this outcome,
as long as the leagues are allowed to win dispositive motions when such rules or decisions are
made subject to antitrust challenge. Roberts, Antitrust Status, supra note 10, at 120. In either
case, however, Roberts draws a crucial line between certain acts of the league that make it a
single entity (the "purely intraleague governance rules or decisions") and other acts which do
not have this effect (everything else). Id.
Weistart argues that the single-entity defense can properly be used to remove "some basic
business decisions" from antitrust scrutiny when the relationships between the various actors
involved "are close to those that earn antitrust immunity in more traditional settings." Weistart,
supra note 10, at 1061.
76. Roberts, Antitrust Status, supra note 10, at 119-20 (emphasis added).
77. Nor does Professor Weistart describe which business decisions are "basic" or discuss
with any particularity the kinds of business relationships that have, "in more traditional
settings," been given antitrust immunity.
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matters but not when it discusses other things, then the nature of the league
would change as the particular topic under discussion shifted and not because
any fundamental change had occurred in the league structure. Nowhere else
in law does the nature of an entity depend upon the particular subject
matter that it happens to be considering but not upon its form or its general
function.
Moreover, it is very difficult to craft a workable definition of "purely
intraleague governance." Perhaps at the extremes, it is not too hard to
separate "purely intraleague" matters from those affecting "outside" in-
terests. The collective adoption by the league members of the rules governing
the play of a football game, 7 for example, might properly be considered a
"purely intraleague" matter. A rule preventing an agreement among those
team owners with interests in the oil business79 to raise the pump price of
their high octane fuel might properly be considered a "purely external"
one. As the rule under discussion, however, moves from one of those
extremes toward the middle of the analytical spectrum, it becomes increas-
ingly difficult to catalogue.
The NFL Constitution and Bylaws contain several rules that forbid league
members from engaging in certain activities that appear not to be purely
internal to the league. For example, no member team may own any financial
interest in any minor league football club,8 0 a prohibition which clearly
restricts the total amount of professional football available to consumers
without directly touching on the operation of the league itself. A separate
section prevents any new team from entering the league without the affir-
mative approval of three-fourths of the existing membership.8' This section
has an undeniable impact on the league itself, but it also has the obvious
potential to affect would-be owners, residents, and businesses in the cities
represented by those would-be owners and consumers in those cities and
elsewhere who would presumably like to see more professional football.
Finally,8 2 the NFL Constitution contains a set of so-called "Television
Restrictions" which limit the areas into which the member teams may
broadcast their games and require that all television income, regardless of
source, be divided equally among all member teams. 3 Again, while it is
78. NFL Constitution, supra note 27, art. XI.
79. For example, Lamar Hunt, owner of the Kansas City Chiefs, and Leon Hess, owner
of the New York Jets, have substantial interests in the oil business.
80. NFL Constitution, supra note 27, art. IX, § 15.
81. Id. § 3.3(C). This approval may apparently be denied or withheld for any reason
whatever.
82. The listing in this paragraph of rules that might arguably affect matters that are not
"purely intraleague" in nature is by no means exhaustive but is demonstrative only.
83. NFL Constitution, supra note 27, art. X, provides in pertinent part as follows:
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clear that restrictions on television income indirectly serve to maintain
competitive balance on the playing field, it also seems clear that they create
bureaucratic and financial disincentives to the broadcasting of professional
games, implicate many other businesses, and probably result in fewer
televised games than consumers desire, all of which tends to indicate that
those restrictions affect more than "purely intraleague" matters.84
On the one hand, if these restrictions, and others, encompass matters
that are deemed to be clearly outside the bounds of the "purely intraleague,"
then Roberts' proposal for single-entity treatment would apply to a very
limited set of rules and decisions, so limited as to make his proposal
impractical. On the other hand, if these restrictions are regarded as not
clearly outside those bounds, then Roberts' proposal would require a court
to establish criteria for determining when a particular rule is "purely
intraleague" in nature, to apply those criteria in a preliminary hearing of
some sort in which the characteristics and effect of the rule or decision
would be at issue, and to spend the very time and energy deciding these
matters that Roberts seeks to save through the application of the single-
entity defense. Roberts' proposal is thus useful only if the nature of the
league's rules and decisions is clear. Since the nature of those rules and
decisions is at best ambiguous, and since efforts to define or classify them
would require the same expenditure of judicial time and effort that Professor
Roberts wishes to save, the proposal for allowing the single-entity defense




(a) No club shall cause or permit a game in which it is engaged to be telecast
into any area included within the home territory of any other club on the day
that such other club is engaged in player [sic] a game at home.
(b) No telecast of a home game within the home territory of a club shall be
caused or permitted, except by agreement between the participating clubs.
(c) Each home club grants to the visiting club the exclusive right to permit or
license the telecast of the game being played between them back to the home
territory of the visiting club ....
Television Income
10.3 All regular season (and pre-season network) television income will be divided
equally among all member clubs of the League regardless of the source of such
income, except that the member clubs may, by unanimous agreemnt [sic], provide
otherwise in a specific television contract or contracts.
84. It seems no less difficult to define "governance." For example, the NFL's Constitution
and Bylaws might be viewed as the League's own description of "governance" questions.
However, it is not clear either from the Constitution itself or from any other source that that
document is meant to encompass all such questions. Nor is it clear that the League's own




IV. THE NEw TOUCHSTONES FOR LEGALITY UNDER THE RULE OF
REASON: "CONSUMER WELFARE" AND "UNDIMINISHED OUTPUT"
Over the past fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court has under-
taken to answer most, if not all, of the crucial questions in antitrust
jurisprudence by applying to those questions a method of analysis that
makes substantial use of the teachings of neoclassical economics.85 This
approach has been the subject of much comment and criticism, particularly
from scholars who believe that the antitrust laws were designed at least as
85. Prior to this time, two more or less distinct approaches had evolved to determine
whether a challenged business practice constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade: the Rule
of Reason and the per se approach. Recent Supreme Court rulings have blurred the functional
differences between these approaches, but it is necessary, nevertheless, to discuss them, at least
briefly, in order to place in context the arguments set forth in the remainder of this Article.
The Supreme Court has defined as per se violations of the Sherman Act certain types of
business conduct so inherently and regularly destructive of competition that they almost
invariably result in unreasonable restraints of trade. The per se definition, however, is reserved
for "manifestly anticompetitive" practices, Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36,
49-50 (1977), a term that has been judged to embrace price fixing, tying arrangements,
horizontal group boycotts, and territorial divisions of markets. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). And the Court has been reluctant to expand the coverage of that
definition, declaring that "[i]t is only after considerable experience with certain business
relationships that courts classify them as per se violations." United States v. Topco Ass'n,
405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972). The Court has even cautioned against an "unthinking application"
of the per se rule:
[E]asy labels do not always supply ready answers.... Literalness is overly
simplistic and often overbroad .... [Ilt is necessary to characterize the challenged
conduct as falling within or without that category of behavior to which we apply
the label "per se price fixing." That will often, but not always, be an easy
matter.
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 8, 9 (1979). See also id.
at 13 n.24.
The Rule of Reason is the method typically used to judge business conduct allegedly in
violation of the Sherman Act. This method focuses "directly on the challenged restraint's
impact on competitive conditions," National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); and requires the finder of fact to "weighfl all of the circumstances
of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition." Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 49. The application of
this test requires that the plaintiff first show that the challenged conduct has an anticompetitive
effect on the relevant market; if the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to justify its acts and to demonstrate that they have a procompetitive effect.
If the defendant does so, the factfinder must then decide if the practice is unreasonable or
not. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468
U.S. 85, 113 (1984).
Typically, therefore, an antitrust court must examine both the challenged practice and the
particular industry affected before deciding whether the Rule of Reason should be applied or
the practice should be condemned as a per se violation. See, e.g. id. at 104 n.26 ("Indeed,
there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis."). The critical
factor in determining an act's legality is its "effect on competition," a phrase which until
recently lacked meaningful content. If, after sufficient inquiry, it appears that the practice
falls into the per se category, no further analysis is necessary. Otherwise, the practice must be
judged by the Rule of Reason and subjected to its competitive-effects test.
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much to preserve certain political and social goals as to promote purely
economic ones .6 Despite this criticism, the Supreme Court seems to have
moved in recent years very much in the direction suggested by economic
theory. The Court's antitrust opinions of the past fifteen years have con-
sistently stressed the importance of the "market impact" and of the "de-
monstrable economic effect" of a challenged business practice.8 7 The Court
has in each case closely examined the economic circumstances of the
businesses whose practices have been challenged. 8  This new, economic
approach to antitrust analysis has been applied to the entire spectrum of
antitrust issues, from price-fixing89 to vertical nonprice restraints," and from
tying arrangements 9' to the presence of a section 192 conspiracy.93 As to all
of these issues, the Court has answered antitrust questions primarily, if not
exclusively, by moving away from a reflexive application of the per se
standard of review and by examining the effect of the challenged business
practice on "competition." For this purpose the Court has largely equated
"competition" with what the Court has termed "consumer welfare" 94 and
86. For years, there has been serious scholarly disagreement about the broad policy goals
that underlie the antitrust laws and the emphasis that each should receive in the interpretation
and enforcement of those laws. This debate is lengthy and continuing. However, it is not the
purpose of this Article to summarize it or to attempt to resolve it but simply to make reference
to it and to some of the many articles that it has generated. See Blake & Jones, In Defense
of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1965); Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional
Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 422 (1965); Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other than
Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 1191 (1977); Kaplow,
The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95
HARv. L. REv. 1817 (1982); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are
the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. Rv. 1214 (1977); Wiley, "After
Chicago". An Exaggerated Demise?, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1003.
87. See Business Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs., 485 U.S. 717, 726, 735 (1988); Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-63, reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984); Continental
T.V., 433 U.S. at 51, 53-55.
88. See cases cited supra at notes 85 and 87; FTC v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447 (1986); Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. 85; Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. 1; United States v. Arnold Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
89. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468 U.S. 85; Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. I.
90. See Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717; Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. 753.
91. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
93. See Matsushita Elec. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
94. The Court has not described consumer welfare as the only goal of antitrust policy, but it
has in recent years bestowed upon it a certain primacy. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) ("[T]he rule of the marketplace... promotes the consumer
interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster."); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343
(1979) (floor debates in 1890 about the Sherman Act suggest "that Congress designed the Sherman
Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription') (quoting R. BORK, THE ANrrrusT PARADox: A POLICY
AT WAR wrT ITSELF (1978)); Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 53 n.21 ("[A]n antitrust policy
divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks.").
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has defined "consumer welfare" generally in economic, rather than in social
or political, terms.
Despite its adoption of "consumer welfare" as the primary goal of the
antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has given remarkably little content to
that term. The Court has neither specifically defined "consumer welfare"
nor described it with sufficient detail to allow a working definition to
emerge. 95 The Court has, however, given some relatively clear indications
of how the term is to be used, and those indications argue strongly in favor
of defining "consumer welfare" in terms of undiminished output.
In several important ways, the Court has articulated its view of the
meaning of "consumer welfare." For the Court, business practices that
increase the output of a particular product and thus lower its price enhance
consumer welfare and are therefore lawful. Conversely, practices that reduce
the product's output and thus raise its price diminish consumer welfare and
are therefore unlawful. 96 Practices that have no effect on output or price
have never been specifically evaluated by the Court, but in light of its recent
decision in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 9 7 the Court would
likely view output-neutral and price-neutral activities as lawful. 98
A large body of scholarship argues that "consumer welfare" should be the sole goal of
antitrust policy. See R. BoRKu, supra, at 50-89; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 4, 18-22 (1976); Baxter, Placing the Burger Court in Historical Perspective, 47
ANTrrRuST L.J. 803 (1978); Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9
J.L. & EcoN. (1966); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, (pts. 1 & 2), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
Cm. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1977).
95. All of the recent advocates of single-entity treatment for professional sports leagues
agree that "consumer welfare" has become the central concern of the antitrust laws. Roberts,
among others, argues that "consumer welfare" will be advanced by affording single-entity
treatment to the various sports leagues. Roberts, Single Entity Status, supra note 10, at 589.
This argument, however, seems flawed in two significant respects. First, Roberts never describes
what he means by "consumer welfare," assuming instead that its meaning is obvious. This
failing makes it difficult to follow Roberts' consumer welfare analysis. Second, Roberts links
this general idea of "consumer welfare" to his analysis of the single-entity issue in a manner
that is both confusing and illogical. It is confusing because the Supreme Court has used
"consumer welfare" to resolve disputes about the reasonableness of challenged business
practices, disputes whose substantive legality is at issue only because the threshold question of
conspiracy has presumably been answered in the affirmative. It has never used "consumer
welfare" as a criterion for resolving the single-entity issue, nor has it ever suggested that it
should be so used. And it is illogical, because whether two firms should be treated as one
seems logically to hinge on an analysis of the interrelationship between the two firms, not on
an analysis of whether their business advances some undefined notion of consumer good.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 98-108.
97. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
98. The main issue in this case was whether USA, a competitor of Arco admittedly injured
in its business by Arco's decision to have its retail dealers sell gasoline at "below market"
but nonpredatory prices, had standing to sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act, which
requires a private antitrust plaintiff to allege and prove "antitrust injury." The Supreme Court
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The Court's focus on consumer welfare in general and on undiminished
output in particular appears most clearly in Broadcast Music99 and in
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). 1°° In Broadcast Music,
the Court was asked to rule on the question of whether, by issuing "blanket
licenses"''1 to copyrighted musical compositions at fees negotiated by them,
the petitioners, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American Society ,of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), had engaged in a form of
price-fixing that was per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The court of appeals had held that since both BMI and ASCAP were
membership organizations representing thousands of copyright holders a
blanket fee setting a unitary price for all copyrighted compositions was by
its nature an agreement among competitors-the individual holders of the
copyrights-to fix the price at which their products would be sold. The
appellate court explained that earlier decisions of the Supreme Court gen-
erally condemned all forms of price-fixing'02 and the facts of this case
compelled the conclusion that the blanket licensing practiced by the defen-
dants was unlawful. 0 3
The Supreme Court refused to hold blanket licensing unlawful per se,
despite its recognition that such licensing was indeed a form of collective
price-fixing.' °4 In some measure, this refusal had to do with the Court's
lack of familiarity with the musical copyrighting industry and with that
industry's peculiar history of legislative and judicial oversight. 05 In large
part, however, the Court's willingness to put aside the per se rule and to
use the Rule of Reason to examine an admitted group price fix was explained
by its determination to assess the actual economic effect of the price fix,
had previously defined antitrust injury as "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
In the course of discussing the purpose of the antitrust injury requirement, the Court in
Arco noted that conduct that contravened the antitrust laws could have three possible effects,
often interwoven: "[Tihe conduct may reduce competition, in other respects it may increase
competition, and in still other respects may be neutral as to competition." Arco, 110 S. Ct.
at 4551. As to these three possible effects, the Court stated that a private plaintiff satisfies
the requirement of antitrust injury "only if [its] loss stems from an [sic] competition-reducing
aspect or effect of the defendant's behavior." Id. (emphasis in original). By obvious implication,
behavior whose competitive effects are neutral does not create antitrust injury within the
meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. It may not be stretching the analogy too far to
conclude as well that behavior which is competition-neutral does not harm consumer welfare
and therefore does not violate the Rule of Reason.
99. 441 U.S. 1.
100. 468 U.S. 85.
101. According to the Court, a blanket license gave the licensees "the right to perform any
and all of the compositions owned by the members or affiliates [of the petitioners] as often
as the licensees desire for a stated term." Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 5.
102. Most notably United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, reh'g denied,
310 U.S. 658 (1940).
103. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers,
562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977).
104. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 23-24.
105. Congress and the courts had supervised that industry and its practices for years prior
[Vol. 67:25
SPORTS LEAGUES
rather than simply to condemn it on the basis of its existence alone. °6
The Court's holding in Broadcast Music helped to create a new meth-
odology for the resolution of price-fixing claims and at the same time to
provide antitrust analysis with a new perspective. As before, the resolution
of a challenge to an alleged price fix started with a determination of whether
the per se rule should be used to decide the case. However, while past
antitrust doctrine would have required the application of that rule to any
group decision to fix price, the Court in Broadcast Music held that hence-
forth the characterization of certain conduct as a price fix would be
insufficient by itself to invoke the per se doctrine. The per se rule would
apply, the Court said, only when the conduct in question threatened the
proper functioning of "our predominantly free-market economy-that is,
[where] the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output."1'07
Admittedly, the Court in Broadcast Music employed some of the same
ambiguous antitrust vocabulary that it had used for decades. For example,
if a price-fixing agreement was clearly a "naked restraint of trade with no
purpose except the stifling of competition,"' 08 the agreement was unlawful
per se. However, if the agreement was arguably part of an amalgam of
joint activities, the net effect of which was to "increase economic efficiency
and render markets more, rather than less, competitive,"' 09 then the agree-
ment would be tested by the Rule of Reason. This old language, though,
was accompanied by something new and important: for purposes bf antitrust
methodology, the term "competition" was no longer to be so vaguely or
generally defined but was to be given instead a specific economic meaning.
A practice would be deemed to restrict competition if it "would always or
almost always tend to ... decrease output""10 and, by obvious implication,
would be found not to harm competition if it had no such effect on output.
Five years later, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the general
economic approach that it had adopted in Broadcast Music and reiterated
its reliance on undiminished output as the crucial index of consumer welfare
and thus of enhanced competition. In NCAA,"' the universities of Okla-
homa and Georgia, two members of the College Football Association,1 2
to the commencement of the CBS suit and had left undisturbed the very practices challenged
by CBS. Id. at 10-16. It seems clear, however, that these peculiarities would not have mattered
to the outcome of the case unless the Court had been prepared to depart from the apparently
unbending rule proscribing price-fixing that was announced in Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150.
106. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-23 ("[O]ur inquiry must focus on whether the effect
and ... the purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our predominantly
free-market economy . . ").
107. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
108. Id. (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)).
109. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16
(1978)).
110. Id.
111. 468 U.S. 85.
112. The College Football Association was established by five major football-playing
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sued the NCAA for having established a so-called Television Plan (Plan)
that allegedly restricted the total amount of televised intercollegiate football,
the number of appearances on television that any one school's team could
make, and the compensation to be received by a school for each of its
team's televised games.113
As in Broadcast Music, the NCAA was clearly a combination of would-
be competitors. In the absence of the Plan each school would presumably
have been free to sell as many of its games for telecast as the television
networks were willing to purchase and to receive in compensation as much
money as the networks were willing to pay. By jointly selling the television
rights to their football games, the members of the NCAA had collectively
substituted a fixed price per game for the price that the market would have
reached had there been separate and independent bargaining and reduced
the total number of games that would otherwise have been broadcast.
The court of appeals held that the NCAA television plan constituted
illegal per se price-fixing.1 4 The Supreme Court, while recognizing that
price-fixing and output limitations are "ordinarily condemned as" 1 5 unlaw-
ful per se, decided nevertheless to apply the Rule of Reason to the NCAA
plan, because the Court found that the industry in question-intercollegiate
amateur football-needed horizontal restraints on competition if its product
was to be available at all." 6 As in Broadcast Music, the Court bypassed
the per se rule in circumstances where it would previously have been
determinative and resorted instead to the Rule of Reason. The Court also
reiterated that a challenged business practice would be viewed as lawful
only if it was responsive to "consumer preference," which the Court
described as a "fundamental goal of the antitrust law.""11 7 "Consumer
preference," though not specifically defined, was characterized almost ex-
clusively in terms of lower price and undiminished output. "Restrictions on
price and output," said the Court, "are the paradigmatic examples of
restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit."" 's
Finally, the Court's holding-that the NCAA's particular constellation of
restraints was unreasonable-was explicitly premised upon the presence in
conferences and several major football-playing institutions several years prior to the com-
mencement of the lawsuit against the NCAA. Its original purpose was to "promote the interest
of major football-playing schools within the NCAA structure." Id. at 89.
113. Id. at 91-94.
114. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707
F.2d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1983).
115. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100.
116. Id. at 100-01. The same reasoning would almost certainly assure that restraints imposed
on each other by the member teams of a professional sports league-all of which need to
restrain competition in some respects in order to be able to sell their best product-would be
tested by the Rule of Reason and not by the per se rule. And in fact, there is a strong
consensus of opinion, both among the courts and among the commentators, that the business
practices of professional sports leagues should be judged by the Rule of Reason. See supra
notes 7-10.
117. Id. at 107.
118. Id. at 107-08.
[Vol. 67:25
SPORTS LEAGUES
the Plan of what the Court found to be "rules that restrict output.""' 9
The clear message of these cases is that "reasonableness" under the
antitrust laws has come to mean undiminished output. This is a logical
message, both legally and economically. Decreased output would seem to
be an obvious harm for consumers. Economic theory informs us that with
decreased output comes higher prices,' 20 and common sense advises that
decreased output also brings with it the prospect of a smaller variety of
goods, as well as a smaller number, and thus the prospect of diminished
consumer choice.
Moreover, if "consumer welfare" is to mean anything in measurable
economic terms, logic and the process of elimination strongly suggest that
its meaning be linked to output, and to output's corollary, price. The
measurable factors that contribute to, or account in some way for, consumer
welfare are limited. Apart from price and output, very few seem even
arguably appropriate. Along with cost, the Supreme Court has listed quality,
service, safety, and durability as the "elements of a bargain,' 12' but those
last four elements are practically impossible to measure. Higher quality,
moreover, has been described by the Court as an inappropriate justification
for allegedly anticompetitive conduct.12 And Judge (then Professor) Bork
has persuasively argued that competition-either as defined by the number
of firms active in a particular market or viewed abstractly as some unmea-
surable concept of "vigorous" competition-is neither a good measure of
consumer welfare nor an appropriate goal of antitrust policy. 23 Thus, output
and price remain as the only logical and, arguably,' 24 measurable economic
criteria of consumer welfare.
V. PRESENT STATUS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
UNDER TI-E SUPREME COURT'S NEw TEST
If, as I have suggested, the new litmus test for antitrust legality under
the Rule of Reason is undiminished output, it seems clear that almost all
119. Id. at 113.
120. See P. SAMxELSON & W. NoaDAus, ECONOMICS 64 (13th ed. 1989).
121. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
122. See id. at 693-95, where the government sued to nullify the Society's canon of ethics
prohibiting competitive bidding, charging that the practice fostered by the canon served to
suppress competition. The Society's defense rested in large measure on its contention-accepted
for argument's sake by the Court-that the canon was intended to improve product quality,
which would be eroded by price competition between and among professional engineers. The
Court squarely rejected this contention as a defense to a section I price-fixing claim, stating
in effect that the Society could not impose its views of quality-no matter how well inten-
tioned-on the consuming public, which might well wish to trade off higher quality against
lower cost and increased output.
123. R. BoR.K, supra note 94, at 59-61.
124. These are only arguably measurable because of the occasional difficulties, see infra
text accompanying notes 109-15, in arriving at an acceptable definition of "output" and the
relatively constant difficulties in ascertaining whether price increases (which can certainly be
measured by themselves) result from increased costs (which are not always so easy to measure)
or from some other, presumably less innocuous, activity.
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of the activities of a professional sports league pass this test. Practically all
of those activities serve either to increase the league's output or to hold
output constant. Consequently, a section 1125 challenge to league activities
would most probably result in a finding that such activities are "pro-
competitive" and are therefore reasonable and lawful. The single-entity
defense is unnecessary to achieve this result.
The output of the teams of a professional sports league is a profes-
sional athletic contest sanctioned by the league, in other words, a league
game. 126 Although the member teams of a sports league also make
money from such things as souvenirs, concessions, and stadium parking,
all of these items are derivative of the game itself, and none would have
much value apart from its association with a league game. There are
two major markets of buyers for this product: the fans who attend the
game in person (and purchase a ticket for it from the team) and the
television or radio networks who buy broadcast rights to the game from
the league (and then sell advertising time on their broadcasts to com-
mercial sponsors). All other things being equal, the league's teams will
maximize their revenues by selling as many tickets as possible and by
receiving the highest possible price for the broadcast rights to the games,' 27
125. 15 U.S.C. §1 (1988).
126. This describes what the league's output is now, and not what it could be if the league
members chose to organize themselves differently. See supra note 41.
Roberts contends that the league's product is a season of league games, Roberts, Sports
Leagues and the Sherman Act, supra note 10, a contention apparently based largely on an
article by Neale, The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports, 78 Q.J. EcON. 1 (1964).
Neale argues that sports leagues produce "an indivisible product" (a season of league games)
from the separate activities of two or more firms (the teams). "But the product itself is a
peculiar mixture: it comes divisible into parts [games], each of which can be and is sold
separately, but it is also a joint and multiple yet indivisible product [the season]." Id. at 2-3.
I do not share this view. Certainly, the games have more value to their potential buyers
because they are part of a league season. Divorced from that season, however, professional
football games could still be played and would not lose all of their appeal-college football
games do not lack for consumers.
Moreover, viewing the season as the league's output would make a tautology of antitrust
analysis: since there could never be more or less than one football season, for example, the
league members would presumably be free to reduce the number of games and telecasts
available to consumers without fear of antitrust liability; there would still be one football
season per year, as always, and the output of the league could never be deemed to have been
diminished.
The Second Circuit has described the business of the NFL, for example, as "providing
public entertainment in the form of competitive football games between its member teams."
North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1251 (2d Cir.) (emphasis
supplied), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
127. It is important, however, to understand that output cannot be defined in terms of
tickets sold or of income from the sale of broadcast rights. To the extent that some teams do
not sell all of their game tickets in advance of the start of the season, the sale of the remaining
tickets will depend in part on the success of that year's team and also of its opponents. These
factors change from year to year and cannot be directly controlled by the team owners. By
the same token, the income from the sale of television rights is at least partly dependent on
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but their output-the major money-making item that they produce-is the
game.128
If league games are the output of a professional sports league, then it is
only collective decisions designed to reduce the number of such games that
threaten'2 9 to diminish "consumer welfare" within the meaning of Rule of
the perceived popularity of the particular sport and on the willingness of commercial sponsors
to purchase time for advertisements, a willingness that itself must be dependent in part upon
the sponsors' views of the efficacy of such advertisements.
128. For purposes of this discussion, I am assuming that the appropriate definition of the
product market for a professional sports league should be confined to the output of the
league, to its games only, and should not be extended to include a broader market that would
encompass other professional sports or other forms of entertainment.
This submarket approach is not attractive to everyone: several commentators, for example,
have argued that courts have defined the product market in sports cases much too narrowly.
See Roberts, Single Entity Status, supra note 10, at 564 n.8; Roberts, Sports Leagues and the
Sherman Act, supra note 10, at 257 n.135; Glick, supra note 10, at 77-78; Rosenbaum, supra
note 10, at 786, 800, 822; Weistart, supra note 10, at 1037-38. Some cases have also opted
for a more expansive definition. See Theatre Party Assocs. v. Shubert, 1988-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 68,251, at 59,558 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the most popular Broadway shows do not
constitute a separate submarket but are instead part of a broader entertainment market that
might also include sports); Henderson Broadcasting Corp. v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 647 F.
Supp. 292 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (radio broadcasts of only one baseball team are not a relevant
market).
But most courts have adopted the narrow approach for sports. See Aspen Skiing Co. v.
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.20 (1985) (finding separate submarket for
downhill skiing at destination ski resorts); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984) (for live college football broadcasts:
"[I]ntercollegiate football telecasts generate an audience uniquelyattractive to advertisers and
... competitors are unable to offer programming that can attract a similar audience.");
International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-51 (1959) (separate market for
championship boxing); Fishman v. Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,378, at 74,762-64
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (separate market for NBA basketball), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 807
F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986); Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351
F. Supp. 462, 501-02 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (separate markets for professional hockey). And at least
one other commentator has adopted that approach as well. See Lazaroff, Antitrust Analysis,
supra note 10, at 974-79.
The narrow approach to market definition obviously makes it more difficult for the leagues'
practices to pass antitrust muster. In a broader market, such as all sports-professional and
collegiate-or all entertainment, the impact of one league's business practice on total output
would be quite small. In the narrow market, however, if the league restrains output the effect
of that restraint will be much more visible to courts and much more damaging to consumers.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all of the implications of product market
definition in Rule of Reason cases. The Supreme Court has discussed and analyzed the subject
on several occasions. See, e.g., NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, I1 (1984); United States v. Grinnell
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571-76 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
356 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 396 (1956); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
129. Of course, under Rule of Reason analysis, the threat to consumer welfare can be
outweighed by an appropriate competitive justification. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-64 (1984). A reduction in the number of games, for example,
could conceivably be justified by "business necessity"-the teams can survive economically
only at the reduced level of output-if the facts supported the defense.
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Reason analysis.1 30 Very few such decisions come to mind. Presumably, the
teams could agree to shorten the league season. The likelihood of such an
agreement, however, seems small, partly because the number of regular
season games in all professional sports leagues has consistently expanded
over the past thirty years131 and partly because a season containing a
relatively stable number of games permits fans to make the kind of per-
formance comparisons that add to their enjoyment of the product. Con-
ceivably, in order to maximize their revenue from the sale of broadcast
rights to games, the teams could agree to reduce the number of televised
games-thus depriving the viewers132 of those games of a number of op-
portunities to watch televised football. But it is practically inconceivable
that a profit-maximizing league would not already be maximizing its revenue
from this quarter, so the likelihood of this kind of agreement also seems
very low. No other decision designed to reduce output seems plausible. 33
Professor Goldman suggests several kinds of agreements between and
among team owners which, in his view, could lessen consumer welfare. 34
130. From this perspective, it becomes clear why the policy reasons for promoting "consumer
welfare" cannot fairly require increased output from firms subject to antitrust scrutiny. If the
professional sports leagues were required by the antitrust laws to justify every joint action that
might arguably restrain trade by increasing their output, a parade of horribles could ensue.
The league seasons, already much longer than their high school or college equivalents, would
become longer still (the teams in the NBA, for example, open their preseason training camps
in August and conclude their playoff games in June), overlapping one upon the other, competing
more directly for the same consumer dollar, threatening the league with overexposure and loss
of popularity, and jeopardizing the health of the teams' most important capital assets, their
star players, who would presumably be placed at greater risk of injury or loss of skill by the
additional number of games that they would be required to play. In this way, a legal directive
to expand output could eventually threaten the economic viability of the leagues.
131. The American League of professional baseball added eight games to its schedule in
1961, moving from 154 to 162, and the National League did likewise in 1962. Telephone
interview with reference librarian of The Baseball Hall of Fame (Aug. 22, 1990). The teams
in the NBA played 68 regular season games in 1950 and now play 82. Telephone interview
with reference librarian of The Basketball Hall of Fame (Aug. 22, 1990). And the NFL's
schedule expanded from 12 to 14 games in 1960 and from 14 to 16 in 1978. Telephone
interview with reference librarian of The Football Hall of Fame (Aug. 22, 1990).
132. The viewers of televised games are arguably not the consumers of those games; the
broadcast rights are purchased by the television networks. Rather, the viewers are consumers
twice removed; the networks buy the games in order to sell air time to commercial sponsors,
who buy the air time in order to sell their products to the viewers.
133. The league members could agree on a change in the rules of the game that would have
the unintended effect of reducing attendance at games. In 1969, for example, immediately
following Denny McClain's 31-win season and Bob Gibson's 1.12 earned run average, the
Major League Baseball owners, believing that fans preferred high-scoring games to low-scoring
ones, lowered the height of the pitcher's mound by 10 inches in an effort to bring more run
scoring to the game. Kornheiser, No Rhyme, No Reason To No-Hitters, Wash. Post, July 3,
1990, at El, col. 1. Their decision seems to have been correct, but viewed ex ante it might
not have been. The effect of the decision on attendance, however, should not have any
antitrust consequences, because attendance is not output and a reduction in attendance,
occasioned by whatever reason, is not the same thing as a reduction in the number of games.
134. Goldman, supra note 10, at 770.
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First, he says that an agreement to fix ticket prices would not benefit
consumers. 3 This is certainly true, but this particular harm to consumers
would probably be one that the antitrust laws are not designed to remedy:
if the price-fixing agreement were not accompanied by a reduction in the
number of games, it would hurt the teams just as much as the consumers.
Presumably an increase in the price of a game ticket would result in fewer
tickets being sold. However, since the total number of the games and the
marginal cost of the games would remain the same, the teams' reduced
income would not be offset by any reduction in their costs, and they would
suffer as much as their consumers. This is not the behavior of monopolists.
Second, Goldman hypothesizes that the teams could agree on a reduction
in the "output" of televised football, in order to enhance league revenues.1
3 6
A reduction of output, however, would enhance league revenues only if,
for reasons unexplained by Goldman, the leagues are currently acting
irrationally. This assumption of irrationality does not seem very plausible
because it assumes the leagues are not currently maximizing revenues. 3
7
Third, Goldman claims that the player restraints already adopted by the
leagues, such as the player draft or the reserve clause, could "limit league
output and reduce consumer welfare" by discouraging quality players from
undertaking a career in professional sports. 3 Assuming that the effects of
such restraints could somehow be measured, it is quite possible that player
restraints could serve to lower the quality of league play. The antitrust
laws, though, do not require any firm either to achieve or to maintain any
particular level of product quality. 39
Finally, Goldman suggests that franchise expansion decisions may impli-
cate consumer welfare concerns. An expanded league, of course, would play
an expanded schedule, and the output of the league would thus be increased
by expansion. The league, however, should not be obliged by the antitrust
laws to increase output; it should be required only to refrain from decreasing
it. 4° By itself, a joint decision not to expand the size of the league would
not reduce output. Moreover, a requirement that sports leagues add new
members would burden the leagues in a uniquely unfair manner. No other
private joint venture has ever been obligated-either in the name of con-
sumer welfare or of anything else-to take on additional venturers against
its will. For these reasons it seems unlikely that franchise expansion decisions
could properly evoke consumer welfare concerns.
135. It is important in this regard to keep in mind the difference between affirmatively
benefiting consumers-a result that the antitrust laws do not seem to require, see supra note
98-and not harming them.
136. Goldman, supra note 10, at 796.
137. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
138. Goldman, supra note 10, at 770 n.92.
139. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
140. See supra note 130.
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There are, then, very few agreements, decisions, or rules made by the
member teams of professional sports leagues that could serve directly and
intentionally to reduce the leagues' output. The antitrust issues raised by
those few that might be found to exist can certainly be resolved by the
application of the Rule of Reason without placing in jeopardy the continuing
viability of the leagues themselves and without using an inordinate amount
of judicial time and energy. The single-entity defense is not necessary to
achieve either of those results.
CONCLUSION
The application of the single-entity defense to the member teams of
professional sports leagues is not consistent with existing antitrust doctrine.
It would represent not only a marked and unwarranted deviation from the
clear line established by Copperweld and its progeny, but would also create
unworkable distinctions between league rules and decisions arguably affect-
ing matters of "purely intraleague governance," on the one hand, and all
other matters, on the other, and would require as well that the antitrust
bench expend substantial time and energy attempting to resolve those
distinctions.
Moreover, the value of that defense-both to the leagues themselves and
to the antitrust judiciary-is questionable. If, as I argue, undiminished
output is the proper measure of consumer welfare for purposes of Rule of
Reason analysis, almost all league decisions that affect some aspect of the
game will successfully pass antitrust muster. Those few that do not can be
comfortably resolved by traditional Rule of Reason analysis.
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